Introduction
The notion that the causes and effects of international economic sanctions are channelled through domestic politics in both the sanctioning and target countries is certainly nothing new to the international relations literature. In identifying expressive as opposed to instrumental impacts, Galtung (1967) suggested that economic sanctions might be usefully viewed as political signaling devices. Lindsay (1986) discussed the symbolism of sanctions both in regard to domestic and international constituencies. More recently, Morgan and Schwebach (1996) have used a spatial bargaining model to show that sanctions can be successful in attaining their political objectives in the target country under certain circumstances if the sanctions impose significant costs on politically powerful segments of the target society.
The public choice approach, however, further formalises and systematises an interest-group analysis of political processes. Public choice theory requires for the most part that we reject single rational-actor models of international relations in favour of an analysis of domestic interest-group pressures. According to the public choice approach, both foreign and domestic poliCies are viewed as endogenous regulatory outcomes brought about through interest-group struggles over domestic wealth redistributions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992b, ch. 2) . In this chapter we will show how public choice theory helps to resolve some of the most puzzling aspects of international economic sanctions, such as why sanctions are used with considerable frequency despite the common perception that they are ineffective, and why even severely damaging sanctions are often unsuccessful in achieving their political objectives while much less damaging or even symbolic sanctions are sometimes surprisingly effective politically.
The next section identifies some of the advantages of applying a public choice approach to the study of sanctions. The third and fourth sections develop interest-group models to explain, respectively, the origin of sanctions policies in the domestic polity of a sanctioning country and the political impacts of sanctions in a target country. The final two sections present some implications of our approach and conclusions.
The public choice approach to international economic sanctions
Economists and political scientists who have studied international economic sanctions have often expressed considerable skepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions as a means to bring about economic dislocation and desired political responses in target countries (see Knorr, 1975, p. 154; Losman, 1979; Doxey, 1980, pp. 120-1; Renwick, 1981, p. 87; Bayard et al., 1983; and Black and Cooper, 1987) . It is generally pointed out that sanctions are costly to the sanctioning countries as well as to the targets, that substitution possibilities in world markets diminish the impact of boycotts, and that severe sanctions can induce perverse political responses in a target country whereby its citizens 'rally around the flag' and lend increased political support to the ruling regime. Moreover, sanctions rents arising from the terms-of-trade effects of trade embargoes can be captured by interest groups within the target country (Carbaugh and Wassink, 1988) , creating a strong incentive for these groups to resist acquiescence to the desires of the sanctioners.
However, such pessimistic conclusions regarding the workability of economic sanctions are somewhat puzzling in the light of the fact that recent years have seen an increase rather than a decrease in the use of sanctions. Furthermore, there has been a widening of the range of issues for which sanctions have been used or threatened. Although the most common uses of sanctions in the post-World War Two period have been for moral, foreign policy and national security reasons, recent concerns about the US trade deficit and perceptions of unfair competition from abroad, combined with the growing new research literature on strategic trade policy (see, for example, Krugman, 1987) , have given rise to increased interest in the use of trade sanctions as instruments of commercial policy. Such sanctions have been imposed or threatened by the
